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The Effect of Cross-Listing on Insider Trading Returns

Abstract

Holding privileged positions within firms, insiders can acquire excessive private benefits based
on their informational advantage. The bonding hypothesis suggests that this can be prevented
when a firm is cross-listed on an exchange with higher regulatory and legal costs compared to its
home exchange. When cross-listed insiders buy and sell shares, the returns earned are lower than
in domestic firms. This difference is due to the increased shareholder protection in cross-listed
firms that constrains the extraction of private benefits, such that when cross-listed insiders trade,
they trade for non-informational reasons.
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1. Introduction

We examine the impact of the bonding hypothesis on Australian company insiders, in terms of
the effect of cross-listing on the returns insiders earn when they trade in their own firm’s shares.
According to Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), the bonding hypothesis suggests that firms
in countries with weaker investor protection can cross-list to markets with stricter regulation and
better enforcement to signal their intent to improve investor protection. This improved investor
protection results in increased stock returns post cross-listing and empirical support for the
bonding hypothesis has been provided by Reese and Weisbach (2002), Doidge (2004) and
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004),

The decision to cross-list and its resulting effects on the firm’s shareholders has been extensively
examined, though very few studies have considered the managerial perspectives or incentives
involved with the decision to cross-list. In this paper, we investigate its impact on managerial
incentives where reduced private benefits were expected after cross-listing due to the bonding
impact. These private benefits acquired through insider trading are part of corporate governance
and demonstrate the potential agency conflicts with outside shareholders. Abnormal returns from
trading in one’s firm’s shares reflect the opportunity that controlling shareholders and managers
have to extract private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. Firms on the other hand can
only obtain external funding if they can ensure investors a return on their investment and
discourage an environment where benefits can be extracted by these parties for their personal use
(Karolyi, 2006). Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) suggest that managers can be “bonded” or
constrained from taking excessive benefits by a firm’s listing on an exchange with higher
regulatory and legal costs, compared to its home exchange. These constraints can be direct in the
3

form of laws, disclosure and enforcement actions by the overseas exchange, regulatory bodies
and the courts or indirect via increased scrutiny by analysts and the media. However because
regulatory bonding is difficult to observe directly, it is necessary to investigate its effects. In this
paper, the effect of bonding on insider trading returns where insiders in firms are bonded to a
higher regulatory environment are examined and these returns are expected to be lower
compared to returns in domestic firms.

Besides the decision to cross-list, the destination also appears to be an important factor in
preventing the extraction of excessive benefits. Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) showed that
firms with US cross-listings have higher valuations compared to non cross-listed firms and
Roosenboom and van Dijk (2009) found that the destination market influences the creation of
value around the cross-listing. The destination is also expected to affect insider trading returns
where cross-listing to exchanges with better investor protection is expected to result in lower
returns. However in a study of Canadian firms cross-listed on a US exchange, King and Segal
(2004) reported that cross-listing may not provide equal benefits for all firms because only firms
with active US trading experienced increased valuation. Korczak and Lasfer (2008) investigated
UK firms cross-listed in the US and reported that: their trades were less informative compared to
those in domestically listed firms, and the bonding effect was isolated to sell transactions only.
The bonding hypothesis was been almost exclusively been tested on cross-listing on US markets
due to their reputation for the most stringent regulations and higher legal costs However,
skepticism over the effectiveness of enforcement over cross-listed firms on US markets exists
(Siegel, 2005), which leaves the effectiveness of the bonding effect an open question.
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Our sample consists of two types of firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX):
those with an additional listing on either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ
and those with only a domestic listing. The cross-list sample is limited to these two US markets
because Beny’s (2005) comparative analysis of insider trading laws in 33 countries ranked the
US slightly above Australia in terms of overall regulation and enforcement. Although insider
trading regulation and enforcement is a small part of overall regulation and enforcement and
Siegel (2005) reported ineffective enforcement of regulation for foreign issuers, Doidge et al
(2004) and Stulz (2004) showed that the additional investor protection afforded by US exchanges
constrains the extraction of private benefits of control2. Therefore, in this paper, we assume that
when Australian firm cross-list on the NYSE or Nasdaq, they are subject to additional and higher
regulatory and legal enforcement, as expected in the bonding hypothesis. As such, we compare
the dual exposure of these cross-listed firms to the insider trading regulations of the US and
Australia to domestic firms subject to Australian insider trading regulation only.

The results show that the likelihood of cross-listing increases with firm size and growth
opportunities. Besides being significantly larger in terms of market capitalisation and total assets,
cross-listed firms have similar performance to domestic firms but lower borrowings and more
analysts coverage. The results support the bonding hypothesis where insiders in cross-listed
firms earn lower returns from their trades compared to their counterparts in domestic firms, when
they buy and sell shares. This is due to the better investor protection afforded to shareholders in
cross-listed firms where because of the reduced incentives to trade as a result of lower
information asymmetry, insiders trade only for non-information reasons. Cross-listing therefore

2

These exchange listed firms are subject to SEC oversight and threat of US securities regulation, required to file
Form 20-F and increase disclose in compliance with US GAAP (Korczak and Lasfer, 2008).
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affects the trading behaviour of insiders which results in improved investor protection for the
shareholders of the firm.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the literature review and
hypothesis while the research method and data are discussed in Section 3. We present the results
in Section 4 and the summary and conclusions in Section 5.

2. Theoretical background and hypothesis

Listings on US exchanges are generally linked to positive firm valuations (Foerster and Karolyi,
1999) and several explanations have been advanced for these gains. These include market
segmentation, liquidity, information environment and investor protection. The market
segmentation hypothesis suggests that cross-listing overcomes investment barriers between
countries and thus results in reduced risk premium and cost of capital (Errunza and Losq, 1985)
with Miller (1999) reporting higher returns for emerging market firms than firms from developed
markets when they cross-listed on US markets. Firms that cross-list on more liquid and deeper
markets also experience lower cost of capital (Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). A firm’s information
environment also changes with cross-listing where this resulted in increased media following,
more analyst coverage, improved forecast accuracy and high accounting quality (Baker,
Nofsinger and Weaver, 2002; Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003). Finally, the investor protection
explanation argues that firms “bond” themselves via cross-listing on exchanges with higher
standards of investor protection so that the interests of minority shareholders are protected
(Coffee, 1999; Stulz, 1999)
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Faff, Hodgson and Saudagaran (2002) investigated the cross-listing decision from Australia, a
relative small market to larger international markets and reported that in general, these firms
experienced a large drop in returns subsequent to listing. Another study on the Australian market
also questioned the benefits of cross-listing where Ahmed, Kim and Henry (2006) reported no
higher returns or reduced risk benefits from cross-listing in countries with better investor
protection, or higher quality accounting reporting and disclosure. In addition, Durand, Gunawan
and Tarca (2006) found no variation in the observed return patterns between different listing
locations. Overall, these studies on the experience for Australian firms suggest limited benefits
from cross-listing.

In this paper, we use the investor protection explanation via the bonding hypothesis to explain
the effect on reduced managerial incentives, that is, returns from insider trading. The impact of
cross-listing on the returns earned by the firm’s insiders is considered from the perspective of
improved investor protection or “bonding” the firm’s management and controlling shareholders
to stricter regulatory requirements. Coffee (1999) discussed the legal mechanisms of US listings
to which firms are “bonded” and Stulz (1999) highlighted the role of “reputational
intermediaries” existing in the US markets such as analysts, underwriters, debt-rating agencies,
exchanges who provide extra monitoring (Karolyi, 2006). Empirically, there is support for the
bonding hypothesis with Miller (1999) reporting higher announcement day returns for exchange
listing compared to SEC Rule 144a private placements and OTC listings. Over the longer term,
Foerster and Karolyi (1999) also report similar reactions. In terms of the decision to cross-list,
Reese and Weisbach (2002) found that the legal systems from which firms originate influence
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the probability of listing where firms from countries with weak legal protection tend to cross-list
in the US. A cross-listing premium of 16%, measured by Tobin’s q for firms from different
countries with a US cross-listing was reported (Doidge et al., 2004)

The strength of the bonding hypothesis has been challenged. Licht (2003) asserted that the
enforcement of stringent regulation is grossly overstated because the SEC was not an efficient
enforcer of corporate governance rules for foreign issuers. In his assessment of the SEC’s foreign
firm enforcement policy, Siegel (2005) found only 25 cases of legal action against foreign firms
since the enactment of the federal securities laws in 1933. He argued that foreign firms listed in
the US are not equivalent US firms and can often acquire exemptions from some governance
standards compulsory for US firms. According to LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (2002), cross-listing in New York could improve disclosure but not necessarily give
minority shareholders many effective rights3. Some others that have questioned the benefits of
bonding include Pinegar and Ravichandaran (2004), Bris, Cantale and Nishoitis (2007) and
Gozzi, Levine and Schmuckler (2008). Specifically in terms of insider trading, the effectiveness
of the bonding hypothesis is questioned because all firms cross-listed in the US are exempt from
releasing information about director deals (Licht, 2003)

The effect on bonding on the controlling shareholders and insiders has largely been examined as
an exogenous effect. On the contrary, insiders can influence the decision to cross-list. Doidge,
Karolyi, Lins, Miller and Stulz (2009) showed that controlling shareholders are less likely to
cross list in the US when private benefits are high due to the constraints on the consumption of
3

According to Brown and Tarca (2005), the Australian regulatory framework is similar to the US, UK and other
developed markets, suggesting that the benefits from cross-listing, at least from the perspective of better investor
protection, is limited.
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such benefits after cross-listing. Charitou, Louca and Panayides (2008) questioned the legal
aspect of the bonding hypothesis when they reported a relationship between cross-listing and
CEO incentives to maximise private benefits. Hong and Huang (2005) advanced a similar
argument about disclosure via investor relations where they identified one benefit to insiders as
the increased liquidity of their shareholdings, in the event of a need to sell their shares. While
cross-listing can reduce information asymmetry for the firm overall and decrease the opportunity
for the extraction of private benefits for a small group of shareholders, it may improve the
liquidity of the shareholdings for that same group. Therefore, while the costs of cross-listing are
borne by all shareholders, insiders may disproportionately enjoy the benefits of increased
liquidity.

A firm’s cross-lasting status is predicted to affect the trading behaviour of its insiders and the
subsequent returns from trading due to the “legal and reputational bonding contracts” (Korczak
and Lasfer, 2008) and the change in firm’s information environment where cross-listing leads to
lower information symmetry resulting from greater analyst following and disclosure. Insiders in
cross-listed firms therefore trade less frequently and when they do trade, due to the lower
information content of their trades, they are more likely to trade for non-information reasons.
Korczak and Lasfer (2008) report that cross-listed directors trade less often and that their trading
is less informative (with lower returns) than trading in domestically listed firms.

Insider trading studies on stock price performance around insider trades report positive abnormal
returns after purchases and negative abnormal returns after sales (Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986;
1992; 1998). Seyhun (1986; 1998) also found that insider trades were more profitable in smaller
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firms and when the insiders were part of top management. In more recent work, Lakonishok and
Lee (2001) reported insider sales generally not to be informative though trades in small firms
were more informative than those in large firms. Similar findings were reported in the UK
(Gregory, Matatko and Tonks, 1997; Fidrmuc et al., 2006), Canada (Baesel and Stein, 1979),
Germany (Betzer and Theissen, 2009) and Hong Kong (Wong, Cheung and Wu, 2000). Fidrmuc,
et al. (2006) attributed variation in the market reaction to insider transactions to the various
aspects of firm ownership including outside ownership, director ownership and types of outside
ownership. In another paper, Fidrmuc, Korczak and Korczak (2010) examined insider purchases
in 15 European countries and the US and found that the reaction to these trades was positively
associated with country level shareholder protection.

In contrast, studies conducted using Australian data (see for example, Brown, Foo and Watson,
2003) have reported insider sales to be more informative than purchases. While there is general
agreement that insider purchases signal the firm’s favourable future prospects, the information
associated with sales is less clear. Insider sales can signal negative information about the firm’s
prospects or alternatively are conducted for liquidity, rebalancing or diversification reasons,
which are less informative. There are possible reasons for this inconsistency between Australian
results and others. A possible explanation is the proportional difference in non-information
trading by insiders, proposed by Hodgson and van Praag (2006). Remuneration differences exist
between countries where for example in the US, executives receive a relatively higher proportion
of their remuneration in options and share schemes than in Australia such that higher information
content is predicted for sales. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) also provide a similar viewpoint when they
reported a relation between market reaction to insider transactions and firm ownership. Another
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reason is the composition of reported trades in different countries due to the various definitions
of insider: that is, parties who required to report changes in their shareholding. In the US,
corporate insiders are defined as a company's officers, directors and any beneficial owners of
more than ten percent of a class of the company's equity securities (equivalent to substantial
shareholders in Australia) while in Australia, the definition is restricted to company directors,
being the parties who are required to disclose under s205G of the Corporations Act (2001).
Therefore when insider trades are examined in Australia, the reasons for trading can be different
to US insiders which also include substantial shareholders.

The bonding hypothesis is therefore expected to reduce the informativeness or information
content of insider trades such that when insiders in cross-listed firms trade, the post trade returns
are lower than in trades in domestic firms.

H1: Insider trades in cross-listed firms have less information content than those in domestic
firms

Several determinants of insider trade profitability have been identified in previous research. An
information hierarchy appears to exist with respect to the accessibility and timeliness of
obtaining material information (Nunn, Madden and Gombola, 1983). It implies that the most
profitable trades are those conducted by CEOs, given their informational advantage. However,
the empirical evidence is not unequivocal on this contention. Nunn et al. (1983) confirmed that
trading by CEOs is superior to other non-executive members of the board because of their ability
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to better time their trades with price movements. On the contrary, Fidrmuc et al (2006) reported
that CEOs earn the lowest abnormal returns, compared to other board members.

Trade size is also expected to affect profitability. In a cross-sectional analysis of insider trading,
Seyhun (1986) documented that the dollar value of the insider’s trade is a significant factor in the
trade’s profitability. Insiders look to capitalise on more valuable information and trade larger
amounts accordingly. Firm size can also influence profitability. Greater information asymmetry
for smaller firms implies larger abnormal returns after intensive insider trading for smaller firms.
Some US studies have found a significant negative relationship between firm size and insider
trading profits (Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). However Lin and Howe (1990)
reported an insignificant relationship. Australian studies have found that directors of smaller
firms do not profit significantly from the informational asymmetry usually attributed to these
insiders (Brown et al. 2003).

3. Data and Method

The initial sample consists of firms on the S&P/ASX300 between 2002 and 2007. Cross-listing
information on these firms was obtained from Morningstar’s (formerly Aspect Huntley)
DatAnalysis and JP Morgan’s ADR.com to identify those with at least a listing on the NYSE or
NASDAQ. This process identified twelve cross-listed and 239 domestic firms.

The ASX’s Listing Rules 3.19A and 3.19B and Section 205G of the Corporations Act form the
framework for disclosure in listed entities of directors’ interests in securities and transactions in
these securities. Section 205G requires directors to notify of any change in their interests within
12

14 days while Listing Rule 3.19A necessitates the same disclosure within five working days.
Directors’ interest notices are reported to the ASX via lodgement through the Companies
Announcements Platform (CAP). We obtained the data on changes in insiders’ interests for our
sample firms from DatAnalysis’s ASX Signal G Announcements.

After trades were identified, the following requirements were used to retain trades in the final
sample: the trade must be an on-market trade, the interest held by the director must be direct; the
trade is not an initial or final change in shareholdings, the trade is not conducted during the
blackout period (between the end of the financial year and the release of the earnings report) and
the trade is informative where changes in shareholding based on stock option exercises, bonus
issues and rights issues are excluded. These five requirements reduced the sample to 968
purchases and 621 sales, of which 54 purchases and 70 sales were conducted in cross-listed
firms. Data on firm characteristics and analyst following were obtained from Aspect FinAnalysis
and I/B/E/S respectively.

The standard event study methodology was applied where the event is the reported date of a
change in an insider’s interest4. Cumulative abnormal returns associated with these trades were
measured as size-adjusted returns over five, 10, 50 and 125 days after the report date. Therefore,
size adjusted return is estimated as:
SARi,t = ARi,t - ARSi,t
where SARi,t is the cumulative size adjusted return of share i on day t, AR i,t is the ratio of the
price of share i on day t relative to its price at the start of the period and ARSi,t is the price relative

4

Similar results were obtained when the event date was the trade date, the date the change in interest occurred.
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for a control portfolio of shares of firms in the same size decile. This method of estimating
returns was also applied in Lin and Howe (1990) and Brown et al. (2003). Returns are measured
over five and 10 days to estimate the market reaction to the announcement of the change in
shareholdings and over the longer period of 50 and 125 days to determine the valuation effects of
the trade. These returns also illustrate whether an insider has correctly timed each trade where
price increases are expected after purchases and price decreases (loss avoidance) following sales.

To assess the effect of cross-listing on insider trading returns, these post trade size adjusted
returns over the [0: 50] and [0: 125] windows are regressed on the cross-list variable (XLIST) and
other explanatory variables. The following model is estimated for purchases and sales
individually:

𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖 = α + β𝑋𝐿𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖 + δ𝑌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(1)

Where XLIST is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when the firm is cross-listed on
the NYSE or NASDAQ and 0 otherwise and Y is a matrix of determinants of insider trading
returns, including the trade size or value, position of the insider, the firm’s market capitalisation
and whether the firm belongs in the resource industry.

Doidge et al (2004) argued that a self selection bias may exist because the decision to cross-list
may be affected by country specific and firm specific characteristics such as size and growth
opportunities. Insider trading returns can be different in cross-listed firms due to the additional
legal and regulatory oversight. In an OLS regression such as in Equation 1, the error term may be
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correlated with whether the firm is cross-listed or not, leading to biased OLS estimates. In other
words, the cross-listing variable is endogenously determined. We account for self selection like
Doidge et al (2004) by running two stage least squares (2SLS) and two stage Heckman type
procedures. Another related issue is the firm size effect where lower returns are associated with
large firms due to lower information asymmetry in these firms (Banz, 1981). Larger firms are
also more likely to cross-list. When the cross-listing variable (XLIST) is used to explain
differences in returns between cross-listed and domestic firms due to the bonding hypothesis, it
has to be attributed to the cross-listing status, rather than the size difference. That is, the size
effect of cross-listing firms has to be disentangled from the cross-listing effect. We attempt to
account for this effect by using size adjusted returns where the size effect is controlled so that it
does not play a role in the abnormal returns measure.

The range of determinants of insider trading returns include trade size or value, position of the
insider, the firm’s market capitalisation and whether the firm belongs in the resource industry.
The size of the parcel traded can be indicative of the information possessed by the trader or the
confidence in such information such that a positive relationship is predicted between the size of
the trade and abnormal returns. However, according to Barclay and Warner’s (1993) stealth
trading hypothesis, informed traders may try to conceal their activities by trading in smaller
quantities. While Seyhun (1986) reported a positive relation between trade size and returns, Lin
and Howe (1990) and Brown et al. (2003) were not able to show such an effect. We use three
measures of trade size: number of shares traded, value of the parcel where the value of the parcel
trade is estimated as the number of shares traded by the trade price and a relative size measure
where the value of shares traded is deflated by the market value of equity.
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The information hierarchy hypothesis suggests that informational advantage results from
accessibility to information. Nunn et al. (1983) reported that CEOs had informational advantage
over major shareholders and vice-presidents in timing their trades. Seyhun (1986) reported that
executive directors earned higher returns and Lin and Howe (1990) also found support for the
information hierarchy. However, Ravina and Sapeinza (2009) show that with purchases,
independent directors make positive abnormal returns, the difference with executives being
relatively small.

Market capitalisation was included because it is associated with information asymmetry. Seyhun
(1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) expected trades to be more profitable in smaller firms
where greater information asymmetry is expected and hence greater profits. Seyhun (1986)
found firm size to be negatively associated with abnormal returns although Lin and Howe (1990)
and Brown et al. (2003) did not find such a result. Other studies include the industry effect but
we only control for the resource industry due to the prevalence of firms involved in the resource
industry in Australia and its associated information. Brown et al (2003) found insider sales in
resource firms to be more profitable than those in non-resource firms.

Table 1 shows the characteristics of firms in the sample. The mean market capitalisation for
domestic firms is $1,206 million compared to $513,933 million for cross-listed firms. Crosslisted firms are also larger than domestic firms in terms of total assets ($18,070 million vs.
$1,951 million) with medians of $689 million and $351 million respectively. Although the
average cross-listed is almost twelve and nine times larger than the average domestic firm in
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market capitalisation and total asset terms, there is significantly more variation in size in the
former. Firm performance, as measured by the return on assets show that cross-listed firms
(mean of 5.7%) do not outperform domestic firms (mean of 4.5%) with the difference in mean
being insignificant. Domestic firms have more debt to equity than cross-listed firms with mean
values of 55% and 35% respectively. Consistent with previous research, cross-listed firms also
have more analyst following and growth opportunities with domestic firms.

<Insert Table 1 here>

Table 2 describes the insider trades in the sample. There are 968 purchases and 621 sales,
showing that insiders buy more frequently than they sell. However although sales occur less
often, they are larger in terms of the number of shares traded in the parcel, the value of the parcel
(estimated as number of shares multiplied by share price) and relative value.

<Insert Table 2 here>

A comparison of purchases between cross-listed and domestic insiders shows that the latter buy
in larger parcels, both in terms of number of shares and value, although the relative value of their
purchases is smaller than in cross-listed firms. However from the t-tests, these differences are not
significant. The medians show that while domestic insiders buy a larger number of shares, the
parcel value and relative value is high in cross-listed firms. The Wilcoxon test shows that only
the difference in number of shares is significant at the 0.10 level. Higher share prices in the
cross-listed firms compared to the domestic firms is the reason for the difference. In Australia,
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insider trading policies are determined by the firms themselves and being an aspect of corporate
governance, large firms are expected to have better governance systems. The larger relative
mean and median values of the cross-listed purchases could indicate the restrictiveness of trading
policies in these firms that limit the frequency of trading.

With their sales, domestic insiders also trade in larger parcels, in terms of number of shares and
relative parcel value. The mean number of shares sold and the mean relative value of the parcel
are 139,800 shares and 0.243% respectively (median values of 69,500 shares and 0.045%)
compared to 41,820 shares and 0.007% in cross-listed firms respectively. However, the mean
difference in value of parcel is not significant while the difference in medians is significant with
domestic directors selling parcels of higher value. The significant difference in relative value for
sales between cross-listed and domestic insiders could indicate information content because sales
are conducted for information and non-information reasons and the size of the sale could be
indicative of information content.

The post-trade returns associated with insider trades are presented in Table 3. Size-adjusted
returns measured over five, 10, 50 and 125 days after the trade is reported are presented in Table
3 with purchases in Panel A and sales in Panel B.

<Insert Table 3 here>

The market reacts negatively to insider purchases in cross-listed firms where the returns over five
and 10 days are negative, though only significant over the five day period. The median returns
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are also negative, indicating that at least 50% of the market reaction was unfavourable. By
comparison, the market reacts positively to purchases in domestic firms with returns in both
windows being significant. Over the longer period of 50 and 125 days, the returns for cross-listed
firms continued to be negative, indicating that these insiders encounter losses with their
purchases. At least half of these insiders earn negative returns trades because the medians are
also negative at -2.3% and -13% respectively. In contrast, the domestic directors earn positive
returns of 1.6% and 5.4% over the 50 and 125 day period, of which the latter is statistically
significant. The differences in means are statistically significant for the [0: 5] and [0: 125]
returns while for the medians, all differences are significant except for the [0: 50] return.

With sales, the market reaction to cross-listed insiders’ sales is positive over the five day period
and negative over the 10 days period, both being insignificant. For domestic insiders, the returns
are 0.3% and -0.1% respectively and also not significant. Over the longer period, the mean and
median returns to domestic sales are negative, showing loss avoidance while for cross-listed
insiders, the returns are positive. Unlike domestic insiders, cross-listed insiders fail to avoid
future losses when they sell their shares. The t-test is significant at the 0.01 level for the [0: 50]
return with the difference in medians also significant (Z = -3.719, p < 0.01).

This univariate analysis where returns have been adjusted for size shows that differences exist
between cross-listed and domestic directors in the returns associated with their trades. Domestic
insiders behave like other insiders in that they buy before a price increase and sell before a
decrease. However, their cross-listed counterparts experience losses with their purchases and
sales. With more than half the trades with returns in the direction opposite to that predicted, it
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would appear that these trade maybe conducted for non-informational reasons. Insiders in crosslisted and domestic firms may have differing motivations and incentives for trading and these
motivations may be reflected in the trade returns.

4. Results

Table 4 presents the analysis where the impact of cross-listing on insider returns is examined on
purchases and sales separately. Results are presented for OLS, 2SLS and Heckman type
regressions. As previously discussed, the OLS estimates maybe biased because the cross-listing
variable is endogenously determined. To overcome this issue and consistent with previous work
having the same prevailing problem (see Doidge et al. 2004; Korczak and Lasfer, 2008), we also
present 2SLS and Heckman-type regressions. The likelihood of cross-listing is first estimated
using a probit regression where the dependent variable is 1 for firms cross listed on US markets
and 0 for domestic firms. The probit results show that cross-listed firms with insider purchases
are larger than domestic firms while in firms with sales, these firms are also larger with better
growth opportunities. This finding is consistent with Doidge et al.’s (2004) theory that firms with
higher growth opportunities are more likely to cross-list. The likelihood of cross-listing is then
used as an instrument in the 2SLS regression. The difference between the 2SLS and the
Heckman type procedure is the inverse Mill’s ratio in the latter. It is a selectivity term included
in the second stage equation to correct for self-selection. In cases where the Mill’s ratio is
significant, the OLS estimates are biased and the Heckman estimation is more efficient.
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In Panel A, there is no difference in 50 day returns between cross-listed and domestic insiders
when they purchases shares for the OLS, 2SLS and Heckman regressions5. However, when
returns are estimated over the longer period of 125 days, the XLIST coefficients on the OLS
(-0.24, p < 0.05) and Heckman (-0.80, p < 0.01) are negative and significant. This shows that
after taking into account size differences between firms using size-adjusted returns, the bonding
hypothesis is supported because insiders in cross-listed firms earn lower returns when they buy
shares, compared to domestic insiders. This result differs from Korczak and Lasfer (2008) where
cross-listed insiders earned higher returns than domestic insiders when they bought shares. It is
also important to account for self selection because the λ in the Heckman regression is positive
and significant for the 125 day return window. Taken together with the univariate analysis, we
know that the difference is due to losses sustained with cross-listed insider purchases.

The information hierarchy hypothesis is not strongly supported for insider purchases as the
coefficients are consistently negative though only significant in two of the six regressions. The
negative coefficient shows that executive directors earn lower returns than non-executive
directors, where the information hierarchy hypothesis suggested the opposite effect.

Given the prevalence of firms in the resource industry in the Australian market and the
information asymmetry within this industry, insider purchases earn higher returns in resource
firms than in other firms. Four of the six coefficients are positive and significant. This result is in
contrast to Brown et al (2003) who reported the resource effect for sales only. Trade size does

5

Similar results were obtained with market adjusted returns.
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not have an effect on returns, regardless of how it is measured. Three measures of size were used
and the coefficients were all insignificant.

For sales in Panel B, the XLIST coefficient is positive and significant in three of the six
regressions. This result is similar to Korczak and Lasfer (2008) who also reported the bonding
hypothesis for sales. In a similar vein to purchases, at least half of the cross-listed insiders do not
sell their firm’s shares to avoid a future loss which indicates that the sale has not made based on
information about the firm’s future prospects. It is therefore likely that the additional regulatory
scrutiny changed the information environment which reduced their opportunity to earn excessive
returns. Therefore, it is likely that sales were conducted for non-informational reasons. The result
is also stronger over the 50 day return window than the 125 day window, again showing that
there is no strategic reason for trading. Both λs in the Heckman regressions are also negative and
significant, indicating a bias in the OLS estimates.

The EXEC dummy variable is negative and significant only in the 2SLS [0: 50] regression while
the RESOURCE coefficient is positive and significant in the Heckman [0: 125] regression.
Therefore, the information hierarchy and resource industry effects are weak and generally not
present in the analysis. The trade size effect was not evident with sales with all three size
measures. However, only the results for the relative value measure are presented in Table 4.

<Insert Table 4 here>
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5. Summary and Conclusions

In this paper, the bonding effect is examined where returns from insider trading proxy for the
private benefits of control. We study the trades of insiders because of their position within firms
where they have access to information not generally available to other shareholders. We use the
arguments of Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999) that insiders can be prevented from
extracting excessive private benefits via cross-listing because of the higher regulatory scrutiny of
the destination market. The implicit assumption is that firms cross-list to a higher regulatory
environment to obtain benefits such as less market segmentation, improved liquidity, better
information environment and enhanced investor protection. We compare the bonding effect
between cross-listed and domestic firms and predict that it will reduce trading returns for insiders
when they buy and sell shares.

We define cross-listing in this paper for the purpose of testing the bonding hypothesis as firms
cross-listed on either the NYSE or NASDAQ. In our sample, these firms are about ten times
larger than the domestic firms with less debt and more analyst coverage and better growth
opportunities. However in terms of performance, cross-listed firms do not perform significantly
better than domestic firms.

The market reaction to announcements of insider purchases (sales) in cross-listed firms is
negative (positive). Over the longer term, cross-listed insiders sustain losses with their purchases
and sales. This result is puzzling because it is irrational that insiders with their private
information would buy shares to make a loss when the timing of the trade can be controlled.
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However for sales, it is likely that there are other reasons for the sale besides the firm’s future
prospects such as liquidity or portfolio rebalancing. Domestic insiders’ behaviour was consistent
with other insiders and they earned positive returns with their purchases and avoided losses when
they sold their shares. The bonding hypothesis is supported for both purchases and sales because
the returns cross-listed insiders earned are lower than those earned by domestic insiders. Crosslisting changed the information environment and the trading behaviour of its insiders such that
they are less likely to trade on private information. When these insiders traded in their own
firm’s shares, they trade for non-informational reasons and our measure of returns cannot capture
the reason for the trade. The interests of shareholders, especially uninformed investors are
therefore protected because insiders do not exploit their informational advantage to trade on
price sensitive information. Overall, if the objective of cross-listing is to improve investor
protection, this can be achieved from the perspective of insider trading returns.

While our paper finds support for the bonding hypothesis from the managerial incentives
perspective, it has not taken into account other differences between cross-listed and domestic
firms. Cross-listed firms may have different governance mechanisms which in turn affect firm
insider trading policies. Remuneration packages are also likely to differ with insiders receiving
varying proportions of their remuneration in the form of options and shares such that share
trading becomes more important to personal wealth. This in turn changes the proportion of
informed trading undertaken by insiders. Future work in this area should include other aspects of
managerial incentives such as executive remuneration and ownership information.
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Table 1
Firm characteristics: cross listed and domestic firms
Cross-listed firms (n = 12)

Market Capitalisation ($ mil)
Total Assets ($ mil)
Return on Assets (%)
Gearing (%)
Analyst Following
Market to Book

Mean
13932.68
18070.14
5.70
35.17
7.11
4.58

Median
1995.58
688.60
10.30
39.54
7.00
4.65

Domestic only firms (n = 239)
Mean
1206.84
1950.75
4.48
54.78
6.14
3.28

Median
443.58
350.50
6.00
39.05
6.00
2.29

t
12.484***
9.615***
0.861
-2.256**
2.503**
3.395***

Z
-7.296***
-2.538**
-3.237***
-1.227
-1.681*
-9.639***

Market capitalisation and total assets are measured in AUD. The t-test measures the difference in means while the Wilcoxon test measures the difference in medians.
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.

Table 2
Characteristics of trades by insiders in sample firms
Cross-listed firms (n = 12)

Domestic firms (n = 239)

Purchases (n = 968)
Number of shares (thousands)
Parcel value ($ thousands)
Relative value (%)

Mean
39.48
71.05
0.078

Median
10.00
24.61
0.009

Mean
61.09
153.73
0.069

Sales (n = 321)
Number of shares (thousands)
Parcel value ($ thousands)
Relative value (%)

41.82
828.26
0.007

4.00
25.48
0.001

139.80
758.27
0.243

Median
17.00
21.83
0.005

69.50
122.95
0.045

t
-1.340
-0.938
0.190

-4.620***
0.214
-2.465**

The parcel value is measured in AUD. The t-test measures the difference in means while the Wilcoxon test measures the difference in medians.
*** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.
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Z
-1.709*
1.154
0.623

-8.332***
-4.005***
-10.419***

Table 3
Post trade size adjusted returns: cross-listed and domestic firms
Cross-listed firms
Returns

Mean

Median

Domestic firms
Mean

Median

t

Z

-0.023
-0.030
-0.023
-0.130

0.011***
0.026**
0.016
0.054***

0.003
0.004
0.013
0.027

-2.943***
-0.879
-0.646
-2.449**

-3.580***
-2.600***
-1.422
-3.441***

0.005
0.012
0.013
0.002

0.003
-0.001
-0.034***
-0.023

-0.001
-0.012
-0.050
-0.055

0.139
0.015
3.041***
1.309

-0.361
-1.251
-3.719***
-2.529**

Panel A: Purchases (n = 968)
[0: 5]
[0: 10]
[0: 50]
[0: 125]

-0.022**
-0.018
-0.011
-0.091***

Panel B: Sales (n = 321)
[0: 5]
0.004
[0: 10]
-0.001
[0: 50]
0.032
[0: 125] 0.031

Statistical significance from zero is estimated for the means and the t-test measures the difference
in means while the Wilcoxon test measures the difference in medians.
* indicates statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.

Table 4
Effect of cross-listing on insider trading returns
Panel A: Purchases

Constant

Probit
-7.74***
(-5.79)

XLIST

OLS
0.29
(0.86)
-0.09
(-1.11)

[0: 50]
2SLS
-0.27**
(-2.42)
-1.09
(-1.53)

λ
REL_VALUE
EXEC
RESOURCE
MVE
M/B

Year dummies
Pseudo R2
R2
Wald Chi2
n

0.29***
(4.56)
0.03
(1.24)

0.00
(0.13)
-0.04*
(-1.77)
0.08
(0.59)
-0.01
(-0.52)
-0.00
(-1.54)

-0.00
(-0.31)
-0.08*
(-1.91)
0.37*
(1.72)

Included

Included

Heckman
0.12
(1.61)
-0.31
(-1.34)
0.10
(0.94)
0.00
(0.66)
-0.04
(-1.59)
0.09**
(2.04)

Probit
-7.74***
(-5.79)

0.29***
(4.56)
0.03
(1.24)
Included

0.12

[0: 125]
OLS
2SLS
0.37
0.01
(0.89)
(0.09)
-0.24**
-1.11
(-2.14)
(-1.42)

-0.01
(-0.57)
-0.01
(-0.10)
0.19
(1.25)
-0.01
(-0.54)
-0.00
(-0.58)

-0.01
(-0.81)
-0.03
(-0.81)
0.44*
(1.90)

Heckman
0.03
(0.36)
-0.80***
(-2.92)
0.27**
(2.11)
-0.01
(-0.89)
-0.01
(-0.15)
0.23***
(4.19)

Included

Included

Included

49.01

68.47

0.12
0.04

0.11
14.18
588

19.88
588

Panel B: Sales
[0: 50]
Constant

Probit
-16.79***
(-8.33)

XLIST

OLS
-0.38***
(-2.58)
-0.01
(-0.20)

[0: 125]
2SLS
0.13**
(2.03)
0.33***
(3.87)

λ
REL_VALUE
EXEC
RESOURCE
MVE
M/B

Year dummies
Pseudo R2
R2
Wald Chi2
n

0.75***
(7.89)
0.07***
(3.16)

0.00
(1.00)
-0.02
(-1.10)
0.04
(1.34)
0.02***
(2.68)
0.01**
(2.03)

0.02**
(2.50)
-0.04**
(-1.99)
0.01
(0.31)

Included

Included

Heckman
-0.03
(-0.92)
0.14***
(3.07)
-0.08***
(-2.89)
0.00
(0.03)
-0.01
(-1.05)
0.04
(1.58)

Probit
-16.76***
(-8.33)

0.74***
(7.90)
0.07***
(3.11)
Included

0.37

OLS
-0.67
(-1.79)*
-0.05
(-0.95)

2SLS
0.03
(0.37)
0.29**
(2.47)

-0.01
(-0.74)
-0.01
(-0.26)
0.08
(0.99)
0.03*
(1.76)
0.00
(0.17)

0.01
(0.44)
-0.03
(-0.86)
0.05
(1.15)

Heckman
-0.14**
(-2.46)
0.09
(1.28)
-0.08*
(-1.78)
-0.01**
(-2.16)
0.00
(0.03)
0.09**
(2.15)

Included

Included

Included

37.18

38.82

0.36
0.14

0.11
41.17

44.69

382

379

The OLS, 2SLS and Heckman-type regressions are presented in this table. In the first stage probit regression for the 2SLS and Heckman
procedures, the dependent variable takes a value of 1 when a firm is cross-listed and 0 otherwise. The second stage 2SLS regression uses XLIST as
an instrument (fitted value). λ is the inverse Mill’s ratio, a selectivity term estimated in the first stage Heckman procedure. The dependent
variables are cumulative size adjusted returns measured over 50 and 125 days where day 0 is the date when the trade is reported. The independent
variables are as follows: REL_VALUE is the natural logarithm of number of shares traded multiplied by trade price divided by the firm’s market
value of equity; EXEC is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 when the insider is an executive director and 0 otherwise; RESOURCE is
an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 when the firm is in the resource industry and 0 otherwise; MVE is the natural logarithm of the
market value of equity at balance date and M/B is the ratio of the firm’s market value of equity to its book value of equity. Regression coefficients
are given with the t-values in parentheses. * indicates statistical significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1%.
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